OPINION: The Great China-US Divide: AI for Good Versus AI Weaponisation

OPINION: The Great China-US Divide: AI for Good Versus AI Weaponisation
/Xinhua.

A partnership between UNESCO and Chinese coding platform Codemao is helping introduce artificial intelligence (AI) education into Kenyan schools, offering a practical illustration of China’s argument that technology should advance humanity. Since the initiative began, more than 1,200 Kenyan students have received training, while 20 schools across four counties have established coding programmes.

For Augustine Nzuki, a teacher at Tala Township Primary School in Machakos County, the difference between theory and practice became apparent during a sponsored visit to Shenzhen, China. Having previously taught robotics largely in theory, he had the opportunity to operate a drone and interact with a robot for the first time. He now plans to share his experience with 20 neighbouring schools.

This train-the-trainer approach illustrates an important principle: AI progress is not simply about building increasingly sophisticated machines, but also about equipping people with the skills to use them. By extending coding and digital literacy to African educators and students, China is advancing its argument that AI should be an instrument of human development rather than an extension of geopolitical power.

The initiative forms part of a broader Chinese push for international AI cooperation. In July 2026, China advanced the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) in Shanghai, proposing a platform for collaborative innovation, inclusive development and coordinated governance. Its stated ambition is to narrow the technological divide by supporting developing countries through training, digital infrastructure and institutional capacity-building.

China has also pursued international capacity-building through the United Nations. In 2024, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Chinese-sponsored resolution on international cooperation in AI capacity-building, with more than 140 countries as co-sponsors. Such initiatives reinforce Beijing’s argument that developing nations should have a greater voice in shaping AI governance, rather than leaving decisions to countries that already dominate the technology.

The practical applications extend beyond education. Following Myanmar’s devastating earthquake in 2025, an AI-powered Chinese, Myanmar and English translation system based on DeepSeek technology was deployed within seven hours to assist rescue workers and affected communities. In agriculture, Chinese-supported smart farming projects in countries including Cambodia demonstrate how digital tools can help farmers improve productivity.

China-Africa educational cooperation is also extending into vocational training. AI laboratories in Kenya and automation programmes in Tianjin, northern China, illustrate efforts to connect African talent with Chinese technological expertise. If sustained, such exchanges could help African learners acquire skills relevant to industrial development and emerging employment opportunities. These initiatives provide tangible examples of how AI can be applied to address practical development needs.

However, the wider contest over AI is complicated by the strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. The United States increasingly approaches advanced AI through the lens of national security. Washington argues that sophisticated semiconductors and computing systems could strengthen China’s military, intelligence and cyber capabilities. Export controls introduced and expanded in recent years have consequently restricted Chinese access to advanced chips, manufacturing equipment and related technologies.

While national security concerns are legitimate considerations for governments, restrictions on advanced computing can have consequences beyond military competition. They may also affect civilian research, medical diagnostics, scientific discovery and industrial innovation. When access to critical technology becomes an instrument of geopolitical containment, the effects can extend far beyond the countries directly involved in the rivalry.

China, meanwhile, presents the deployment of AI across manufacturing, agriculture, healthcare and public administration as an alternative emphasis. Its industrial scale and expanding research ecosystem provide opportunities to test and implement AI applications across numerous sectors. The emergence of DeepSeek has further challenged assumptions about the resources required to develop competitive AI models.

According to DeepSeek-AI’s DeepSeek-V3 Technical Report, published in December 2024, training the model required 2.788 million Nvidia H800 GPU-hours, at an estimated cost of US$5.576 million, based on an assumed rental rate of US$2 per GPU-hour. The report states that the model achieved performance comparable to leading proprietary systems, including GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, on several benchmarks, while being developed at a substantially lower estimated training cost.

For Africa, the stakes are particularly high. The continent needs affordable computing, reliable digital infrastructure, skilled professionals and technologies adapted to local priorities. Partnerships with China, the United States and other countries can contribute to these objectives, provided African governments retain meaningful control over their development choices and technological priorities.

Ultimately, the AI contest should not be reduced to a choice between Chinese cooperation and American security concerns. Both powers pursue national interests, and both have a responsibility to ensure that technological rivalry does not undermine shared progress. Africa must also avoid becoming merely a battleground for competing technological ambitions. Its governments should negotiate partnerships that build local capacity, protect data, support innovation and deliver measurable public benefits.

The UNESCO-Codemao initiative offers a useful starting point. Teachers are acquiring practical skills, students are learning to code, and knowledge is being shared between schools. WAICO and other international cooperation proposals will need to demonstrate comparable results on a wider scale.

AI’s greatest measure of success will not be which country controls the most advanced chips or develops the most powerful models. It will be whether the technology improves lives, expands opportunity and helps societies confront common challenges. China’s claim to champion AI for humanity will ultimately be judged not by its declarations, but by its ability to translate that vision into lasting and inclusive benefits.